Thomas Carnahan
U.S. Public Delegate
U.S. Mission to the United Nations
New York, New York
November 18, 2021
AS DELIVERED
Thank you, Madame Chair, for your leadership of the Second Committee this year.
We take this opportunity to clarify U.S. policy positions on several issues found in Second Committee resolutions. A comprehensive version of this statement will be available online.
We underscore that the resolutions negotiated during the Second Committee as well as many of the outcome documents referenced therein, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, are non-binding and do not create new or affect existing rights or obligations under international law, nor do they create any new financial commitments.
The United States strongly supports the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and implementation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda. At the same time, we uphold and respect the authority, independent mandates, and role of other existing institutions. Similarly, indicators, governance proposals, and language developed through the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development have no precedential value for the International Financial Institutions and the UN must not comment on decisions and actions in forums such as the World Trade Organization. Similarly, UN negotiations, including the outcome document of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, are immaterial to our position on trade.
We strongly support Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) as a tool to help countries cope with the impact of COVID-19 pandemic. However, we do not agree to language linking SDRs to sustainable development goals as SDRs are not designed for that purpose.
Relatedly, the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) extension through December 2021 is the final extension. Broad-based deferrals of debt service payments under the DSSI beyond 2021 are not appropriate.
Concerning concessional finance, the proper fora to discuss eligibility measures are the Boards of the Multilateral Development Banks and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
The United States notes that the Middle-Income Country (MICs) designation is a World Bank income grouping, in contrast to the UN groups of countries in special situations. We believe the Addis Ababa Action Agenda uses the most accurate and appropriate statement of our financing commitments in regard to MICS. In this regard, we believe “MICs face significant challenges”
and partners should work “to ensure that the diverse and specific needs of MICs are appropriately considered and addressed.” These statements from the Addis Ababa Action Agenda should guide language on financing and MICs in Second Committee resolutions.
Resolutions negotiated as part of the Second Committee should only reference Member State-negotiated outcome documents from UN conferences. We do not support references to the Kunming Declaration or the Speighstown Declaration, which are conference host statements rather than UN Declarations.
With respect to the New Urban Agenda, the United States believes that each Member State can determine how it conducts trade with other countries and this includes restricting trade in certain circumstances.
As we seek to end the global COVID-19 pandemic, multilateral and global efforts to improve global access to safe, effective, and quality-assured COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and relevant health products should rely on products that have been authorized for emergency use or prequalified by the World Health Organization.
While the United States acknowledges the UN system increasingly uses the term “illicit financial flows,” we continue to have concerns that this term lacks an agreed-upon international definition.
Finally, the United States supports disaster risk-reduction initiatives and we reiterate our views on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction from the 2015 U.S. Explanation of Position. Thank you very much.
Full General Explanation of Position on Second Committee Agenda Items for Action
On behalf of the United States government, I would like to extend our thanks to Ambassador Vanessa Frazier as chair of this Second Committee session, as well as to the Vice Chairs. We recognize their hard work and dedication, which has kept the important work of the Second Committee on track despite these challenging circumstances. The pandemic has brought into focus the vulnerabilities in our interconnected world. We are proud to stand here in solidarity with all Member States as we work together to address these complex challenges and build back better.
We take this opportunity to clarify the U.S. policy position on several issues found in Second Committee resolutions.
We underscore that the resolutions negotiated during the Second Committee session as well as many of the outcome documents referenced therein, including the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, are non-binding and do not create new or affect existing rights or obligations under international law, nor do they create any new financial commitments.
Consensus Documents: We standby the commonly agreed norms that have upheld the integrity and effectiveness of the United Nations and multilateral system. Resolutions negotiated as part of the Second Committee should only reference Member State-negotiated outcome documents from UN conferences. We do not support references to the Kunming Declaration or the Speighstown Declaration, which are conference host statements rather than UN Declarations.
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: The United States strongly supports the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and as we did in joining consensus in 2015, we particularly welcome its emphasis on central, cross-cutting themes that drive progress on sustainable development, including inclusion, transparency and the rule of law, human rights, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, the empowerment of women and girls, sustainable environmental practices, and the use of science and data to support policymakers.
The United States also underscores that paragraph 18 of the 2030 Agenda calls for countries to implement the Agenda in a manner that is consistent with the rights and obligations of States under international law.
In supporting the achievement of the SDGs, the United States upholds and respects the authority, independent mandates, and role of other processes and institutions. We highlight our mutual recognition, in paragraph 58, that implementation of this Agenda must respect and be without prejudice to the independent mandates of other processes and institutions, and does not prejudge or serve as precedent for decisions and actions underway in independent fora. The 2030 Agenda also does not interpret or alter any World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement or decision, including the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement). Similarly, indicators, governance proposals, and language developed through this process have no precedential value for the International Financial Institutions, including the IMF and World Bank Group.
Further, citizen-responsive governance, including the respect for human rights, sound economic policy and fiscal management, government transparency, and the rule of law are essential to the implementation of the 2030 Agenda.
Addis Ababa Action Agenda: Regarding the reaffirmation of the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, we note that the trade-related language in the outcome document is immaterial to our position. Therefore, our reaffirmation of the outcome document has no standing for ongoing work and negotiations that involve trade.
Trade: The United States supports strong and growing trade relationships around the globe. We welcome efforts to bolster those relationships, increase economic cooperation, and advance prosperity for all people, within the appropriate institutions.
It is our view that the UN must respect the independent mandates of other processes and institutions, including trade negotiations, and must not comment on decisions and actions in other forums, including at the WTO. While the UN and WTO share some common interests, they have different roles, rules, and memberships.
The UN is not the appropriate venue for these discussions, and the United States does not consider recommendations made by the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council
on these issues to be binding. This includes calls to adopt approaches that may undermine incentives for innovation, such as technology transfer that is not both voluntary and on mutually agreed terms.
We underscore our position that trade language negotiated or adopted by the General Assembly or Economic and Social Council, or under their auspices, has no relevance for U.S. trade policy, for our trade obligations or commitments, or for the agenda at the WTO, including discussions or negotiations in that forum.
Special Drawing Rights: Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) are intended to help address the global need for reserve assets. The new $650 billion allocation is already helping enhance liquidity for emerging market and developing countries and countries’ efforts to address and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic. We will continue to support the voluntary channeling of additional SDRs through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to support countries in need. We cannot agree to language linking SDRs, or SDR channeling, to sustainable development goals (e.g., sustainable development) as SDRs are not designed for that purpose. SDRs are international reserves, but they are not a currency, and the technical features and structure of SDRs as international reserve assets make them unsuitable for these purposes. More broadly, the UN, which has a membership and mandate that is distinct from the IMF, is not the appropriate venue for discussing the IMF’s institutional structure, nor for calling on the IMF to take specific actions.
Debt Service Suspension Initiative: Regarding the references to the Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI), the G20 has been clear that the DSSI extension through December 2021 is the final extension, and that countries that may need additional debt relief should seek debt treatments under the Common Framework. Broad-based deferrals of debt service payments under the DSSI beyond 2021 is not appropriate, particularly in light of other important international financial institution initiatives to support developing countries.
Official Concessional Finance: The proper fora to discuss eligibility measures for concessional finance and official development assistance are the Boards of the Multilateral Development Banks and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We do not accept the UN as the appropriate venue for determining eligibility for, and allocation of, these resources.
The United States notes that the “Middle-Income Country” (MIC) designation is a World Bank income grouping, in contrast to the UN groups of countries in special situations. We believe the Addis Ababa Action Agenda uses the most accurate and appropriate statement of our financing commitments in regard to MICs. In this regard, we believe “MICs face significant challenges” and partners should work “to ensure that the diverse and specific needs of MICs are appropriate considered and addressed” should guide statements on financing and MICs in Second Committee resolutions.
New Urban Agenda and Economic Sanctions: With respect to the New Urban Agenda, the United States believes that each Member State can determine how it conducts trade with other countries and that this includes restricting trade in certain circumstances. Economic sanctions are an appropriate, effective, and legitimate tool that can be used to achieve national security and foreign policy objectives. In cases where the United States has applied sanctions, we have done
so with specific objectives in mind, including as a means to promote a return to rule of law, democratic systems, or human rights and fundamental freedoms, or to respond to threats to international security.
Illicit Financial Flows: While the United States acknowledges the UN system increasingly uses the term “illicit financial flows,” we continue to have concerns that this term lacks an agreed-upon international definition. Without an agreed-upon definition, resolutions should be clearer about the specific underlying illegal activities, such as embezzlement, bribery, money laundering, other corrupt practices, and other crimes that produce or contribute to the generation and movement of illicit finance. Equally, all Member States should focus more concretely on preventing and combating these crimes at home.
Access to COVID-19 Health Products: We fully recognize the critical importance of facilitating timely, equitable access to safe, effective, and quality-assured COVID-19 vaccines, therapeutics, diagnostics, and other relevant health products. Multilateral and regional efforts to improve global access to these products should rely on those that have been listed for emergency use or prequalified by the World Health Organization, or that have been authorized by stringent regulatory authorities/WHO-Listed Authorities, such as the Food and Drug Administration or European Medicines Agency. Unsafe, ineffective, substandard, or falsified vaccine products could have adverse public health consequences and undermine confidence in the global response effort and in safe and effective COVID-19 tools.
Disaster Risk Reduction: The United States reiterates our views on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction from the U.S. Explanation of Position delivered in 2015. We strongly support disaster risk-reduction initiatives designed to reduce loss of life and the social and economic impacts of disasters. This assistance helps recipients build a culture of preparedness, promote greater resilience, and aid in climate adaptation reducing impact of climate related disasters.
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